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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
I 'Iainti ff / Appe11ee,

Case No. 960069-CA

vs .
Priority No

2

BRIAN EUiF.NF' HUMPHREY,
Defendant/Appe11ant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NAT?RE Qf PROCEEDINGS

intent . ..;; ..t ribute methamphetamine,

second degree

felony, ;r

s?

. Lation

i

V:. Code Ann

i

(1995), and possessir
4

peisc.
.Ann.

:

.egree felony,
(1995)

>'

violation

- Tr.a*

' j.e

'our: h-~; j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r

the appeal p u r s u a n t to U t a h Code
1996) . ..

- •:. •• •
" '

•

.
•• •

STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES O N A P P E A L A N D
STANDARDS O F A P P E L L A T E REVIEW
1.

T

trooper

proper] y fi rid that the
-

••. •

lefendant w a s d r i v i n g w a s

j u s t i f i a b l y b a s e d o n o b s e r v e d traffic v olations?
appe I 1 rifl

" I t !:'V lew \\\ I -i I i i ,-t I \ i

of whethe. n traffic v i o l a t i o n w a s committed

- ..* rminination
K

.~ e

o f f i c e r " - p r e s e n c e u n d e r a clearly e r r o n e o u s standard.' 7

State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah App. 1995)(citing
State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4, 6-7 (Utah App. 1994)).
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that there

was reasonable suspicion to stop the car for drug related
reasons?

A trial court's determination of whether an

investigative stop was supported by reasonable suspicion is
a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness.
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

State

The trial court's

ruling should not, however, be subjected to wa close de novo
review."

Id.

Rather, some deference is accorded the trial

court because the reasonable suspicion standard itself
"conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge [s]" so
that they can "grapple with the multitude of fact patterns
that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination."
Id. at 939-40.

The standard of review for trial court's

findings of facts are set out in paragraph one, above.
3.

Did the trial court properly find that the

detention of defendant did not exceed the scope of the stop
beyond what was necessary to confirm or dispel Trooper
Eldredge's suspicions %of drug activity or trafficking?

The

standard of review applied to this issue is set out in
paragragh two, above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules, determinative of the issues in this case, are
attached at Addendum A:

2

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Utah Code A n n . § 41-la-1305(5) (1993);
Utah Code A n n . §§ 4 1 - 6 - 1 1 7 , -120, -121 31 0 (2 9 9 3 ) ;
U t a h Code A n n . § 77-7-15 (Supp. 1 9 9 4 ) ;
Utah R. Evid. 2 01;
Utah Admin. R. 714 .
*-..)
STATEMENT QF THE CASS
uen-c* . • 1""" f •'- mati on wi t .1 i

Defendant was charger
f oi ii: cii i lg \ > i Dlati :::i)i is , f i

.,:

r* comply

drug stamp tax, illegal possession

r

• •

• ..e il legal

!irearm, dr ivi ng

under the influence, possession of burglary tool^

iriving
:

:

information

-lSe

enforcement officer (R. 4 - 6 ) .

Following - preliminary hearing, the court ordered the
defendant

*

- :-r I M .ill I n ounl s except tl le

possession of burglary tools allegation (R. 17!.

In

response, the State filed a Second Amended Information

nough

record, defense counsel

apparently filed a Motio:

• Suppress the evidence obtained

from a search of defendan

p<-*.

dri ving (See R, 29) (granting defendant
suppression hearing) .

Following

• motion

* •: rirvje

suppression hearing, *.:,-:

court denied defendant's motion (R. 1 8 8 ) .
• • Def ei ician t ei ite i eel
possession with intent

Ii 1: :i oi ia] g i i:ii ] ty p l e a 1" o
listribute methamphetamine, a

second degree felony (Count
1 .. f<; i u i i " . wee*j.11 "ii

and possession

I 1 IIJ i i i\

In exchange, the State dismissed all other counts
3

89).

Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison to

serve one to fifteen years for the drug conviction, and zero
to five years for the firearm violation, the sentences to
run concurrently (R. 89).
Contemporaneous with his filing a notice of appeal (R.
91), defendant petitioned for a certificate of probable
cause (R. 85-86), which the court granted (R. 87-88).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 24, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Rick
Eldredge stopped a vehicle being driven by defendant on
State Road 191, approximately twenty miles north of
Monticello, Utah (R. 107). Prior to making the stop,
Trooper Eldredge overheard Troopers Ken Collier and Andy
Peterson discussing how Trooper Collier had stopped a red
Pontiac Fiero earlier that day near Bluff, Utah in which
defendant was a passenger (R. 108). Trooper Collier
explained that he stopped the car for no front license plate
(R. 108)• However, after Trooper Collier received consent
from the female driver to search the car and asked defendant
to step out of the car so he could search, defendant yelled
at the driver and told her not to let the trooper search the
car (R. 108). Trooper Collier indicated at this point, "he
felt that something was going on" (R. 108). However, he
respected the driver's right to refuse the search and issued
her a written warning for no front plate (R. 108). Trooper
Collier then allowed the couple to proceed on their way (R.

4

I.,

Trooper Eidredge also learned from the conversation

between Trooper Collier and Trooper Peterson that the female
Peterson, I h':j alleged -."fi t:i f r Lend of t ht:i

driver was Nicki

defendant aini f. he daughter of Trooper Peterson

(R. 108-09).

Trooper Peterson subsequently called Trooper Eldredge
on his radio arid asked Trooper Eldredq*5* to m^el
(j I si'Liss Nirh i { w

IH4)

with li i
t

IIII

D

Trooper Eldredge met Trooper
(P

Peterson .in Crescent Junction

109)

In his patrol car,

Trooper Peterson began to tell Trooper Eldredge about' Nirki
and some i<l hi'i

I.IIUIJ

related problems

|H

10y)

Micki had

been using methamphetamine for six months; his son had told
Trooper Peterson I lidf .N.icki had been us. i.ng methamphetamine
f:or I IiH II, d si' yean , two v» fit!ki;\

ej.i I lei , INI i
n cki had threatened

to kill him, his wife, and herself.; on another occasion,
v111„••11 Nicki had called Trooper Peterson from Colorado, she
tt

wa.ci

s(^

l"i ni "i:11 ni In

HI I dm Il «••" iiini u i i d e r s L a n J fieJI

i m I h e p J i o n e ;""

and that based on what both he and his son had seen, it was
his feeling that Nicki was using drugs pretty heavily
] 1 0)

i
n roopei PeLerson u'l iso i n formed

(R.

T i ooper hldredge 1 fiak

Nicki had recently been involved with a man who was now In
jail for controlled substances, and that he suspected she
had turned to defendant
:

.

« "

.

'

ar

another L'uuict; fui hei di uq hald 1.

•

Trooper Peterson next; stated that I he person traveling
with Nicki was Brad Davis

iMi

in-mejvpul

(R

i n f ii.ii tiki! ii.ui d u o u i

I I mil
(i

5

Tmopei

H] dn I Univis"

Peterson said

I: j oiTi s e v e r a l

officers with the Grand Junction Police Department ("GJPD")
with whom he talked and worked with quite often, including a
Sergeant Franklin of the GJPD Narcotics Squad.

According to

Sergeant Franklin, defendant's name "had been brought up in
several drug-related incidents that had taken place in Grand
Junction, Colorado" (R. 110-13, 179). Specifically, several
people, who were arrested following the raid of several meth
labs in the Grand Junction area, brought up defendant's name
as a person being involved with the labs (R. Ill, 179). In
addition, Sergeant Franklin had told Trooper Peterson that
defendant's name had been brought up as both Mr. Davis and
Mr. Humphrey, one of which was an alias (R. Ill, 179).
Trooper Peterson also said that Nicki had admitted to
him that she had transported drugs from Arizona to Colorado
a couple of months earlier (R. Ill, 140). Trooper Eldredge
then told Trooper Peterson that he had observed Nicki's red
Fiero two or three days earlier traveling southbound near
the Blanding area (R. Ill). Trooper Peterson responded by
saying, "I can bet you that there's drugs in that car" (R.
112).

He suspected defendant and Nicki were transporting

drugs from the Phoenix area, a known drug community, up to
Grand Junction (R. 112). Trooper Peterson also mentioned
that, according to the GJPD, "there was a lot of meth coming
into Grand Junction" (R. 113).
After talking with Trooper Peterson, Trooper Eldredge
talked to Trooper Collier on the radio (R. 113) . Trooper

6

Collier reiterated what had, happened when he stopped the

the defendant appeared "Very, very nervous and scared," and
that defendant dropped or nearl y di Dpped his ID because he
was s h a k i iig s ::: b a ::i ] y

(R

Ill Ill 3)

'

:

'

"

•' ' ' ''

Trooper Eldredge then proceeded south to try to
intercept the Fiero,, thinking that the couple might take
• wa i: cis C :: >] Dradc :i in • ox ie i : t c • a cdi • I • ::: f f d cei s
pa:: i oil iiig t :ie Interstate highway (R • ] 1 4)

Wl lei i T r o o p e r

Eldiedge first observed the Fiero, :i 1: was going north with
• .... In on and ruin f rnnl" plate 111 nhcnil, si.yty mi les
per hour It'1 114)

" As the car passed him, he noticed that

the vehicle appeared dirty and muddy, and he could not see
the t.

-:u

rrooper El dredge f o] Il owed til le • liar

based on his susp i c i on of drug i e1at ed a ct ivi ty and the
traffic violations he saw when he came into contact with the
vehi c1e (R. ] 1 4 2 5

138

1 42)

Trooper Ell d re dge stopped the car at about J , I.J p,m
141)

2

(R.

He approached the car arid asked defendant, now the

After thf
\r was seized and brought to the
sheriff's office, Trooper Eldredge noticed that the front
license plate was in one of car's windows (R. 1 38)
• Throughout the proceedings Trooper Eldredge and
defense counsel inconsistently indicated the events
surrounding the stop occurred after either one o'clock or
three o'clock (R. 122, 1 3 8 , 141, 1 6 1 - 6 2 ) . However, Trooper
Eldredge's apparent reference to a written log, which logged
his transmissions in military time, suggests that the stop
occurred after three o'clock in the afternoon (R. 1 6 7 ) .
7

driver, to produce his license (R. 115). Defendant handed
him a license with the alias of Brad Davis (R. 115).
Trooper Eldredge then asked Nicki, the passenger, to exit
the car and talk with him at the rear of the vehicle (R.
115).

Trooper Eldredge pointed out to her the dirt covering

the rear of the car which obscured the taillights (R. 115).
Nicki retrieved a sock from the car which Trooper Eldredge
used to wipe off the taillights (R. 115).
While Trooper Eldredge ran a driver's license, warrants
and possibly a criminal history check on both of defendant's
names, he spoke to Nicki in his vehicle because it was cold
outside (R. 116, 125-26).

Nicki immediately appeared uvery,

very nervous" and *fidgety" (R. 116). Trooper Eldredge
asked her why she was so nervous (R. 116). Nicki responded
that she was always nervous around cops (R. 116). Trooper
Eldredge thought this was unusual because he and Nicki had
known each other for several years (R. 116). Trooper
Eldredge had home taught Nicki and her family, and his wife
had also been her cheerleading advisor (R. 116). Trooper
Eldredge thought it was strange that Nicki would be nervous
around him since she knew him well (R. 116).
When asked by Trooper Eldredge if she had any
controlled substances in her car, Nicki responded she did
not (R. 116). After asking if he could take a look in her
car, Nicki asked Trooper Eldredge if he had a warrant (R.
116).

He said he did not but was working on getting one (R.

8

116)

Trooper El dredge relayed his suspicions to Sergeant

Doug Hall and dl sen issed get/ti ng a IA arran t (R

3 11 7)

Sergeant Hal 1 fell t there "was not BI lough information for a
IA a:::i:: r ant but advised Trooper Eldredge that a drug dog could
per haps come up and sn i ff the car (R

initially stopped (R

Ill 31 7)

By thi s time,

13 7 18) ,

Trooper Eldredge then decided to la Ik with defendant
a I)i 1111

(R

11 J I' i'I I 1 i i i i i III 11.1

118, 1 45)

el I h i i i.i I ii i» U I

1 J d V J 111 1

Ti oopei El di <

163)

s'.atec . i^ *t,-* c<

varr-d a c o a t

Defendant offered hei his ia-V'
*.*-

" i i I. i r q t • I

JIB,

-

1 bb)

b o t t l e of i n j e c t a b l e
use
iI

!I

III1

ni- 111II 1. i 11 I

prescription*"

Jlh\

-O, led, a black

i r, Lhdt t ime,

•

Trooper Eldredge briefly parted .:-». . *

11-'

(F 3 1 8,

n dr 1 in t t • ::::

T r o o p e r E l d r e d g e .v. givt

revolver

baling followed
cm ' \ri t: h

] eat her j ack-

f HI t

b LI I,i i-J III, d l J C e S

I'rooper Eldredge had barely begun a

conversation with defendant whe^- Ni^k*

defendant,

i, i ) i 11, 1 tl i 1 I I •' ( 1

-.at pocket and :
ill ni i nihil

instead,

xylocaine,
Tlif l;mtt w

the trooper

a nerve block

III'IN"

• a

found a g l a s s
for

epidural

had im pi re sc r i pi-1 on label

on

1 • e d e I a J I <;»w } J I i. i II11.1»11 s 111 s p e n s i n g w i t h o u t a
{"h , 118)

Trooper Eldredge then s p l i t

d e f e n d a n t and Niclki t o q u e s t i o n them s e p a r a t e l y about
> j' I in. d J in ' (r

sn ia] 1

11")

P'o J eiiiicii il

up
the

l u h l T i o o p e i E l d r e d g e i, 1

t

t h e x y l o c a i n e was found i n an a l l e y and g i v e n t o him by a

9

friend (R. 118-19).

Nicki said the xylocaine belonged to a

friend with cancer who was using the drug as a pain killer
(R. 119).
Although the trooper did not immediately see any track
marks on the defendant's arm, he later discovered one in a
vein on the back of defendant's arm (R. 119). Trooper
Eldredge administered field sobriety tests, which the
defendant failed (R. 119-20).3

During the time Trooper

Eldredge was administering the tests, defendant looked
straight ahead, refused to talk to Trooper Eldredge, and
appeared "uneasy" (R. 121-22).
Based on all of these factors, Trooper Eldredge
arrested defendant for driving under the influence of a
stimulant believed to be methamphetamine (R. 122, 169). b
Sergeant Hall arrived at 3:33 p.m., twenty-one minutes after
the stop (R. 122, 167). The drug dog was dispatched at 3:43
p.m., about thirty minutes after the stop, by which time
defendant had been taken to the San Juan County Jail (R.
123, 167).
Nearly one pound of methamphetamine, a small amount of
marijuana, and some drug paraphernalia was found in the

3

On the internal clock test, defendant estimated
thirty seconds in seventeen seconds
(R. 120). On the onelegged stand test, defendant was uvery shaky" (R. 121).
When asked to recite the alphabet from D to X, defendant
instead went from D to Z (R. 121). Trooper Eldredge also
had to explain the nine-step walk and turn test three times
to defendant before defendant could understand and complete
the test(R. 121).
10

Fiero (R 1 24) . ' Officers also uncovered a Rugger nine
iiii :i ] ] :i m e t e r weapon a nd f01 lr o r f:i i > € mc :i : e b o t t ] e s c f
i n j e c t ab 1 e xy 1 oc a i n e

(R

I! 2 -I )
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I
s f i i id ii lgs tl :i at defendai it w a s
justifiably stopped for three separ ate traffic violations,
speedinc. u s^ui^r

j •-

aillights and a missing front
The co in: t '

recognized that because the trooper observed traffic
violations, the pi: etext doctrine had no application „

-nis

case.
POINT II
Unde: t: - standard that i- j . ; : t * ?. " . ;preponderance

- *> dence *

sua| ) 1c

--^abl^h reasonat* •..etermine

trooper possessed articulable facts justifying his stop
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the car defendant was driving.

In making its findings the

trial court considered only the troopers had first-hand
information, obviating the need for further independent
verification.

Moreover, under the totality of the

circumstances, defendant's extreme nervousness was a factor
to be considered in assessing the trooper's reasonable
suspicion that defendant was involved in drug related
activity.
POINT III
The trial court correctly determined that,
alternatively, confirmation of defendant's use of an alias
and his passenger/companion's extreme and inexplicable
nervousness justified expanding the scope of the inquiry.
The trooper used the most expeditious and least intrusive
means in pursuing his further investigation by first
interviewing the passenger, who also was justifiably
detained based on reasonable suspicion of drug involvement.
That brief interview, conducted while waiting for the
results of a license and warrants check, resulted in further
reasonable suspicion of the couple's drug involvement.
Immediately thereafter, the trooper questioned defendant and
fortuitously discovered drugs.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E

C Q U R T

p R Q p E R L y

D E T E R M I N E D

T H A T

T R 0 0 p E R

ELDREDGE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE F1ERO
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
* * . - . : . .

that the

•

i:

i i I 11 i d I r,K|

.isiiiiea

;iafn.

clearly erroneous and t ha+
: •

- iFFU;ta*' rul:r,.: was
s

*

does not suppo;
Eldiedge • * afri
* * * *

related reasons tei .-toper.: the car were

i

argument fails nc
r f indir *:

the record

^. . ± tinaiii-it. .^*a Trooper

. ?

w^. . : drugs
cc*rm

aoiau^ns were

^

» search the

.

.

:..- because

. r.;endant's

, - re:^rd supports the

* * " \ - * br:a:;"e the picit - "ioctr.*"

i

without el. tee it win JO the officer observes a tratfic
violation, regardless of his underlying motivations,
A.
xx

[ T h <

The Trial Courtfs Findings of Fact are
Acppyded Pefgygnce.
+r

•'

aeiermininatic:. .

.r 1 I

I i-

i P W 1 I! I 1

I

I

I" II 1 uri II

11 " O i l I ' l

S

^hetiiei a traffic violation was committed

.*efendan* ^-.ierally argues tn«t :.is rights were
violated under both the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 11. It is unnecessary for
this Court to separately consider claims made under the
state constitution. See State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947#
(Utah App. 1993)(declining to consider claims asserted under
the state constitution where the defendant did not preserve
his claims at trial, offered no separate state
constitutional analysis and claimed no broader
protection)(citations omitted)

in the officer's presence under a clearly erroneous
standard-"

State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 22 0, 224 (Utah App.

1995)(citing State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4 # 6-7 (Utah App.
1994)).

*[The appellate court] consistently defer [s] to the

trial court on matters regarded as "empirical, such as
things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing,
or taking place.'"

Id. (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d

932, 935 (Utah 1994)).

Deference is accorded the trial

court's findings because it is in the "best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of
the proceedings as a whole."

Pena, 896 P.2d at 936.

"On

appeal, [the appellate court] will not disturb a trial
court's findings regarding traffic violations committed in
the officerfs presence unless those findings are against the
clear weight of evidence."
B.
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Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 224-25.

The Stop of the Fiero was Justified at its
Xnceptjpn ap » Traffic Stop Because TrPQpgr
Eldredge Observed Defendant Committing Traffic
Viplatj-Pftg.
What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and

seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.1"

State

v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)(citing Terry v.
QhiQ, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)(quoting Elkins v.
United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (I960))).
Determining whether a search or seizure is "constitutionally
reasonable" involves a two-part inquiry.

Id.

This Court

must first ask whether the officer's action was "'justified
at its inception,'" and second, whether "the resulting
14

detention was *reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place.'"

Id, at 1132-33 (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 19-20).

In State v. Talbot, the court stated that "a stop is
lawful if incident to a traffic violation committed in the
officers' presence."

792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(citing State V, Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988)); see also Lop££, 873 P.2d at 1132.

"An observed

traffic violation gives the officer 'at the least, probable
cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic
offense.'" IJL. (quoting State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 882
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); accord Spuraeon. 904 P.2d at 225.
An officer may legally stop a vehicle whenever he suspects
"that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations.'" Lopez. 873
P.2d at 1132 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979)).

This is because "police officers are under a duty

to enforce the traffic laws."

Id. at 1135; see Spurgeon.

904 P.2d at 225 (finding officer justified in making an
investigative stop for speeding and an equipment violation,
i.e., a broken taillight).5
The trial court found that Trooper Eldredge observed

5

The Spurgeon court noted that broken taillights
violate Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120 (1993) and Utah Admin. R.
714-200-3(4) (1995).
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three traffic violations, to wit: speeding, obscured
taillight and lack of front license plate (R. 174-75; see
findings attached at Addendum B ) .

Specifically, the court

noted that taillights must be functional even during the day
because they must also illuminate when braking.

The court

also found that even though Nicki had been warned earlier
about the licence plate violation, defendant should not have
been operating the car without affixing the license plate to
the front of the car.

The record supports the court's

findings.
1•

Speeding

Trooper Eldredge indicated that the Fiero was traveling
about sixty miles per hour when he first observed it (R. 114).
Defendant argues that the trial court's finding that defendant
was speeding was clearly erroneous because the record contains no
evidence of what the posted speed limit on Route 191 was on
January 24, 1995. However, the court was entitled to take
judicial notice, and evidently did take notice, under rule 201,
Utah Rules of Evidence,6 that the speed limit on that section of

6

Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in
pertinent part:
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial
notice, whether requested or not.
16

Route 191 was fifty-five miles per hour.7
2.

Disfunctional Taillights

Trooper Eldredge could not see the taillights, even
though the vehicle's headlights were illuminated at the
time, because they were covered with mud (R. 114). In Utah,
all vehicles must be equipped with tail lamps and stop
lamps.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-120 and 41-6-121.10 (1993).

*It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive . . . a vehicle
. . . which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any
person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at
all times equipped with lamps and other equipment in proper

7

Since the court found that Trooper Eldredge properly
stopped defendant for speeding, it was not necessary for the
court to make the subsidiary finding that defendant was in a
fifty-five
mile per hour the zone. See Lopez. 873 P.2d at
1130 (u[W]hen a trial court has failed to make findings of
fact on the record, [the appellate court] will 'assume that
the [trial court found facts] in accord with its decision'
whenever it would be "reasonable to assume that the court
actually made such findings.'")(citing State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)).
The speed limit on Route 191 has consistently remained
fifty-five miles per hour since January 2, 1974. See Utah
Department of Transportation, Utah Speed Limit Regulations
(revised ed. 1992)(stating fifty-five mile per hour speed
limit between mile point 52.39, 3000 feet north of Blanding,
and mile point 124.13, just south of Moab, not including
city limits of Monticello, between mile points 71 and 73).
Trooper Eldredge testified that he stopped defendant at mile
point 93 1/2, twenty miles north of Monticello (R. 107).
Plainly, the speed limit, constant for more than twenty
years, would have been a matter of common knowledge, of
which the trial court, situated in Monticello, would have
been aware.
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condition . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117 (1993).

In

order to appropriately function, tail lamps must be free of
dirt and be unobscured, a fact the trial court correctly
recognized.
3.

Missing Front License Plate

Trooper Eldredge observed the car had no front plate
(R. 114). It is a class C misdemeanor "to operate upon any
highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be
registered without having the license plate or plates
securely attached . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305 (5)
(1993) .
In sum, the record demonstrates that the trial court's
findings that Trooper Eldredge justifiably stopped the car
for three distinct traffic violations was not clearly
erroneous.

Nonetheless, defendant argues the trial court

erred in ruling that the stop for lack of a front license
plate was not a pretext for searching the car for drugs.
Appellant's Br. at 14-15.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Recognized that Trooper

glflredge'g Stpp pf tfre Fierp w^s Not » pretext
Stpp»
Defendant supports his pretext claim by arguing that
Trooper Eldredge "was aware that the occupants of the Fierro
[sic] had just been cited by another trooper one hour
earlier for the same violation."

Appellant's Br. at 15

(citing R. 108). The argument is without merit.
The front license plate violation was not fabricated.

18

Defendant admits in his brief that the front plate was not
properly affixed to the Fiero. Appellant's Br. at 14. It
is a class C misdemeanor "to operate upon any highway of
this state any vehicle required by law to be registered
without having the license plate or plates securely attached
. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993).

More

importantly, even though the Fiero had already been cited
for no front plate, the violation continued to exist when
the couple failed to secure the plate to the front of the
car.

Trooper Eldredge was therefore justified in stopping

the car for the same violation since the car was still not
in compliance when he first observed it. As the trial court
noted, even though they had been stopped once before for
the license plate violation, it's still a
violation. They really should not have gone
another mile further down the road without fixing
the front plate; taking it from the window where
it was obviously not visible and placing it out in
front where it would be visible.
(R. 174). Thus, the front plate violation was not
"concocted" as defendant suggests.
Defendant also claims that the trial court
overemphasized the demise of the pretext doctrine in State
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).

He argues "the alleged

license plate violation was motivated by police suspicions
unrelated to the traffic stop."

Appellant's Br. at 15. In

Lopez, the court eviscerated the pretext doctrine, calling
it "superfluous and conceptually flawed."

873 P.2d at 1135.

The Lopez court said stopping a driver is "constitutionally
19

justified" when the officer either observes a traffic
violation or has reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense
is being committed.

Id.

*This is so despite the officer's

motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic
offense."

Id.

The court concluded that drivers who commit

a traffic offense, even one which the police do not
regularly enforce, M o not have a constitutional right to
violate any law enacted by the legislature."

Id. at 1136.

Based on Lopez, the trial court correctly rejected
defendant's pretext arguments.

First, Trooper Eldredge

directly observed up to three traffic violations: speeding,
obscured taillights, and no front plate.

Second, Trooper

Eldredge also had a reasonable suspicion to expect the
defendant was committing a more serious crime, such as drug
trafficking.

Appellee's Br. at Pts. II & III. Whether

Trooper Eldredge's additional motivation for the stop was
based on his suspicion of drugs, an admitted interest (R.
114, 138, 142), is irrelevant because the stop was entirely
justified by observed traffic violations.

Therefore, as

stated earlier, the trial court's finding that the stop of
the car was justifiably based on traffic violations was not
clearly erroneous and should be upheld by this Court on
appeal.
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POINT II
TROOPER ELDREDGE ALSO HAD REASON TO SUSPECT
DEFENDANT WAS COMMITTING A MORE SERIOUS CRIME SUCH
AS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OR TRANSPORTING

PRVgg
Defendant argues that because Trooper Eldredge failed
to verify the facts communicated to him by Trooper Peterson
about defendant's and Nicki's drug involvements and because
the trial court considered some of those facts, including
defendant's nervousness and the couple's trip to and from a
known drug source, the trial court incorrectly concluded
that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop.
Appellant's Br. at 16-22.

Defendant's argument fails,

however, because the trial court relied only on those facts
for which Trooper Peterson was clearly a reliable source.
Additionally, the trial court was entitled to rely on
defendant's behavior and the observations of the couple's
travel pattern in determining reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity under the totality of the circumstances.
A.

The Standard for Proving Reasonable Suspicion
is Considerably Less Than a Preponderance of
the Evidence.

A stop may also be justified "when the officer has
'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the
influence of alcohol . . . [or that] the driver is engaged
in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting
drugs.'"

Lopfii, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Lopez.
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831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).

*There is no

bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable
suspicion."

State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct.

App 1991) (citing State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)).

Instead, reasonable suspicion must be

"based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time
of the stop."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted) .

If reasonable suspicion exists, the officer uhas not only
the right but the duty to make observations and
investigations to determine whether the law is being
violated; and if so, to take such measures as are necessary
in the enforcement of the law."

State v. Whittenback. 621

P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980) (quoting State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d
1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)).
While there is no bright-line test for determining
reasonable suspicion, it is clear that the threshold is met
by less than a preponderance of the evidence.

"[W]here an

officer observes unusual conduct which reasonably leads him
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot" a brief investigative stop and
detention to dispel the officer's suspicion or prevent
criminal activity is justified.

Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88

S. Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994)("an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person
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has committed or is about to commit a crime") (emphasis in
original) .8 As the term "may" in Terry implies, an
officerfs on-the-spot determination of whether there is
reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop
requires a weighing of probabilities:
x

The process does not deal with hard certainties,
but with probabilities. Long before the law of
probabilities was articulated as such, practical
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same -- and so are law
enforcement officers.'
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581,
1585-86 (1989) (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981)); State V, Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah
App. 1992) ("In developing a reasonable articulable
suspicion, law enforcement officers are entitled to reach
'common-sense conclusions about human behavior,'") (citing
Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1586 (1989)).
That is not to say that officers have unbridled
discretion to stop and detain citizens without being able to
articulate some basis for doing so.

"The officer, of

course, must be able to articulate something more than an
8

The reasonable suspicion standard is also codified:

A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp.
23

1994).

inchoate and unparticularlized suspicion or hunch."
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
It is clear, however, that the standard for
establishing reasonable suspicion is a low threshold of
proof.

"The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal

objective justification' for making the stop.

That level of

suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence."

Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 7# 109

S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and some internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).

Accord Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88

S. Ct. at 1884. This Court has also recognized that
reasonable suspicion requires only a minimal level of
certainty.

See State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.

1990) (stating reasonable suspicion "must be based on
objective facts suggesting that the individual may be
involved in criminal activity") (emphasis added).
B*

The Trial Court Correctly Selected Only That
Information Communicated to Trooper Eldredae
Giving Rise to an Articulable Suspicion That
Defendant and Nicki were Involved in Drug-Related
Activity*

The trial court found that Trooper Eldredge had
reasonable suspicion that the occupant's of the car were
involved in drug-related activity to justify a stop based on
the following facts: (1) Trooper Peterson had good reason to
believe that his daughter, Nicki, owner and passenger of the
car defendant was traveling in, was u a heavy methamphetamine
24

user," that she had admitted having transported drugs and
that she had a romantic involvement with someone in jail for
drugs; (2) defendant was traveling under an alias, a
w

somewhat suspicious" circumstance; (3) Nicki was seen two

to three days earlier going south towards Phoenix; (4) there
was evidence that Phoenix was a place from which drugs were
distributed throughout the United States; and (5) defendant
was so nervous when stopped by Trooper Collier that he
dropped his identification (R. 186-87, attached at Addendum
B). 9
The record supports the trial court's findings
supporting the trooper's reasonable suspicion that defendant
and Nicki may have been using and/or transporting drugs.
Prior to the stop, Trooper Eldredge learned from Trooper
Peterson that his daughter had a serious methamphetamine
problem, which included an involvement with a Mr. Judd, an
individual in jail for controlled substances (R. 110), that

9

The court also included in its assessment Nicki's
nervousness (R. 187). Though not precisely articulated, it
is apparent that the court considered this factor only in
its evaluation of the expanding scope of the search
following the stop and not for the purpose of assessing
reasonable suspicion to initially stop the car. In ruling,
the court stated: MT]here was reasonable suspicion to
continue the inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry
or for it to initially have been an inquiry concerning
drugs" (R. 188)(emphasis added). Moreover, the court's
focussed assessment of which evidence it could properly
consider indicates that it correctly recognized that
Trooper Eldredge's subsequent interview with Nicki could not
possibly be included among facts justifying the initial
stop.
25

Nicki had admitted transporting drugs between Arizona and
Colorado (R. Ill), and that defendant was known as both Mr,
Davis and Mr. Humphrey (R. Ill), a fact confirmed by
defendant's handing Trooper Eldredge a license bearing the
alias, "Brad Davis" (R. 115).
In addition, Trooper Eldredge had observed the red
Fiero two or three days earlier traveling south from
Blanding (R. Ill). Defendant and Nicki had been stopped
earlier by Trooper Collier near Bluff, a town not far from
the Arizona border (R. 108). Trooper Eldredge stated that
Arizona was a known drug-distribution source (R. 112, 135).
Finally, Trooper Eldredge learned directly from Trooper
Collier that when Trooper Collier stopped the Fiero earlier
in the day, he felt "something was going on" because
defendant appeared very nervous and scared and was shaking
so badly that he dropped or nearly dropped his driver's
license and that defendant had yelled at Nicki when she
consented to a search of the car (R. 110, 113). This
combination of factors supports the trial court's
conclusions that there was a reasonable suspicion that Nicki
and defendant were using and/or transporting drugs.
C.

Trooper Eldredge Was Not Required to
Independently Verify Trooper Peterson's
Infprmatipnt

Defendant challenges the trial court's reliance on
Trooper Peterson's drug trafficking tip and his "hunches"
which Trooper Eldredge did not independently verify.
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Appellant's Br. at 19-20.

Defendant's challenge is

unsupported by the record and the law.
In addition to information that Trooper Peterson gave
Trooper Eldredge about Nicki, he also told Trooper Eldredge
that GJPD Sergeant Franklin told him that Brad Davis's name
had been brought up in connection with several meth labs in
Grand Junction (R. 110-12) and that Grand Junction was a
community with n a lot of meth" (R. 113). Trooper Peterson
also expressed an opinion that defendant was Nicki's new
drug source (R. 110).
The trial court excluded all of this additional
information in its reasonable suspicion assessment (R. 186).
As defendant notes, see Appellant's Br. at 19, the court
stated that evidence that defendant's name "had come up" in
association with methamphetamine labs was too unspecific to
rely on (R. 179-80, 186). Additionally, as defendant also
notes, see Appellant's Br. at 19, the court refused to
consider Trooper Peterson's opinion that defendant was
Nicki's new drug source.

The court recognized that although

Trooper Peterson was understandably reacting as a concerned
parent, his opinion was only a "conjecture" on which the
court could not rely (R. 186). Therefore, the court
restricted itself only to the information that Trooper
Peterson had first-hand knowledge of.10 Nonetheless,
10

While the information received by Trooper Peterson
from Sergeant Franklin about defendant's involvement in
methamphetamine labs in Colorado is not necessary to support
27

defendant apparently argues that Trooper Eldredge should
also have verified this class of information.

The argument

is equally flawed.
In State v. Grovier. this Court held that *[a]
reasonable suspicion may be premised upon an informant's tip
so long as it is sufficiently reliable."

808 P.2d 133, 135

(Utah Ct. App. 1991)(citations omitted).

In State v. Case,

this Court also recognized that w[a]n investigative stop may
survive the Fourth Amendment . . . if performed by an
officer who objectively relies on information . . . received
from other law enforcement sources."

884 P.2d 1274, 1277

the trial court's ultimate conclusion, the State asserts
that the trial court erroneously excluded it from its
consideration.
u
[T]here is a presumption that law enforcement
officers will convey information to each other truthfully."
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986)(accepting
double hearsay among police officers in support of a
warrant); State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah App.
1992)(noting that because a primary purpose of hospital
security was protection of the public, information gathered
in course of security officers' employment and conveyed to
police was presumtively reliable). In Roth, this Court
found that an arresting officer's observations corroborated
information provided to them by security officers, thereby
further justifying reasonable suspicion to stop the
defendant's car.
In this case Trooper Eldredge corroborated the
information Trooper Peterson received from Sergeant Franklin
about defendant's alias (R. 179) when he examined
defendant's license and found it bore the name "Brad Davis"
(R. 115). Further, Trooper Peterson told Trooper Eldredge
that he worked with the GJPD and often talked with officers
of the GJPD (R. 113). Accordingly, the trial court should
have found reliable Sergeant Franklin's report of
defendant's association with methamphetamine labs and
incorporated that fact into its reasonable suspicion
assessment.
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(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citing United States v. Hensley. 469
U.S. 221, 232 (1985)).

In £a&£, this Court held:

[I]f the investigating officer cannot provide
independent or corroborating information through
his or her own observations, the legality of a
stop based on information imparted by another will
depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts
known to the individual originating the
information . . . subsequently received and acted
upon by the investigating officer.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Defendant mistakenly relies on Case, which is factually
distinct from this case.11 There, this Court held that an
arresting officer, relying on a dispatch, lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant's car.

The Court found that

there was no reliable information underlying the dispatch
indicating why a stop had to be made and the arresting
officer "made no independent investigation or observations
that would provide a separate basis for reasonable
suspicion."

Id. at 1279.

State v. Roth, is closer to the facts of this case.
827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992).

In Roth, hospital security

officers accosted the defendant, who was plainly
intoxicated.

Id. at 256. When the defendant drove away

from the hospital stalling and jerking the car, the officers
11

Defendant also relies on State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1996). Because Anderson involved a determination
of probable cause to arrest, it is not relevant to the
disposition of this case. Cf. State v. Brucer 779 P.2d 646,
650 (Utah 1989)(upholding a stop, challenged for lack of
probable cause, under the less demanding reasonable
suspicion standard).
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notified the university police of an intoxicated male,
providing a detailed description of the car and license
plate.

Id.

This Court held that the ensuing stop was based

on reasonable suspicion, supported not only by reliable
information, but also by the arresting officer's
observations.

Id. at 258; see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d

954, 960 (Utah App.)(finding reasonable suspicion to stop
car based on dispatching officer's cognizance of specific
facts of the offense and arresting officer's reliance on
those facts), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
In the circumstances of this case it would have been
unreasonable for Trooper Eldredge to independently
corroborate the information provided by Trooper Peterson.
First, Trooper Eldredge had no reason to doubt the truth or
the reliability of the information he received from Trooper
Peterson, a fellow police officer.

Nielsen. 727 P.2d at 192

and Roth. 827 P.2d at 258, supra note 10. Also, Trooper
Peterson was Nicki's father.

It was therefore reasonable to

believe that he was well-informed about her activities.
Moreover, the information supplied by Trooper Peterson was
sufficiently detailed to suggest that he was being honest.
Lastly, the information was presumptively true, since
disclosure of his own daughter's drug involvement could only
have been something of an embarrassment to Trooper Peterson.
Second, the information provided by Trooper Peterson
was, to some extent, corroborated by Trooper Eldredge's own
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observations and by the information provided by Trooper
Collier.

Trooper Eldredge saw the Piero going south toward

Arizona two or three days before the stop (R. Ill). He also
knew the Phoenix area was a major drug distribution center
(R. 112, 135). Trooper Collier's account of his earlier
stop of the Fiero also implicitly corroborated Trooper
Peterson's information.

Trooper Collier described defendant

as extremely nervous and shaky and noted defendant became
agitated when Nicki consented to a search of the car (R.
108, 113) .
In sum, the trial court properly recognized that
Trooper Eldredge relied on the first-hand knowledge of
fellow police officers, corroborated and supplemented with
his own observations, regarding those facts supporting his
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and Nicki.

See Roth.

827 P.2d at 258 (finding reasonable suspicion to stop based
on the arresting officer's observations, "coupled" with the
police dispatch).
D.

Defendants Nervousness at the Earlier Stop was
One Factor Creating Reasonable Suspicion for More
Serious Criminal Activity,

Defendant suggests that his nervousness in the initial
stop for the front license plate violation should not be
factored into the reasonable suspicion calculus.
Appellant's Br. at 20. While this Court has said "nervous
behavior alone is insufficient to establish a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity," State v. Potter, 860 P.2d
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952, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added), neither this
Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever said nervousness
is not a factor to be taken into consideration.

Cf. State

v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 951 (Utah Ct. App.) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting) ("Nervousness alone does not provide reasonable
suspicion . . . [b]ut it is a factor to be considered.").

A

defendant's increased nervousness can add to an officer's
already existing suspicions.

United States v. Turner. 928

F.2d 956 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 881 (1991).
Furthermore, this Court acknowledged in State v. Trujillo.
that ua trained law enforcement officer may be able to
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would
be wholly innocent

to the untrained observed."

State v.

Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing
United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980)).
Therefore, Trooper Eldredge was justified in taking the
defendant's nervousness into account as one factor adding to
his reasonable suspicion, particularly in light of his
experience as an officer.
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that
Trooper Eldredge possessed articulable facts prior to
stopping the car to reasonably suspect that defendant and
Nicki, individually and collectively, were engaged in
criminal activity related to drugs.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TROOPER
ELDREDGE DID NOT IMPERMISSIBLY EXCEED THE SCOPE OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH INITIALLY JUSTIFIED THE
STOP WHEN HE QUESTIONED BOTH NICKI AND DEFENDANT
ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE
CAR
Defendant argues that even if the stop was justified
for traffic violations, further detention and inquiry
related to drug investigation exceeded the reasons
justifying the traffic stop.

In particular, defendant

argues that he was impermissably detained for six minutes
(some part of which may have followed the trooper's
discovery that there were no outstanding warrants), while
Trooper Eldredge interviewed Nicki about controlled
substances.

Thereafter, defendant continues, he was

improperly detained when the trooper questioned him about
controlled substances. Appellant's Br. at 22-28.

This

argument fails because following the stop Trooper Eldredge
uncovered further information confirming and increasing his
reasonable suspicion of defendant's drug related activity
from both defendant and Nicki.
A.

The Scope of Defendant's Detention was Expanded
Upon Reasonable Suspicion of More Serious Criminal
Activity.

After reasonable suspicion has been established to
justify a stop, a court then asks whether the resulting
detention was

%%%

reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the interference in the first
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place.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1968)).

Once a stop is made, "the detention 'must be

temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer.
460 U.S. 491f 500 (1983)).

The length and scope of

detention "must be "strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation possible."

Id.

(quoting State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
(quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 19-20)).

The focus is not on

the length of detention, "but on "whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which
time it was necessary to detain the defendant.'" State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
If the sole purpose of a stop is to investigate
possible traffic offenses, an officer "may request a
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a
computer check, and issue a citation."

State v. Robinson.

797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(quoting United States
v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)).
"Investigative questioning that further detains the driver
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity."

Lop££, 873 P.2d at 1132.

In State v. Marshall, defendant was stopped after his
turn signal remained blinking for two miles after he had
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passed another vehicle.

Marshall. 791 P.2d at 881. The

trooper pulled defendant over to inform him of the problem
and issue him a warning.

Id.

Upon the trooper's request,

defendant produced a driver's license, vehicle registration,
and rental car agreement.

The rental agreement said the car

would be returned to New York in five days.

However,

defendant said he was traveling to San Diego, where he would
return the car.

Defendant was also driving along a well-

known drug trafficking route. JLd at 884. The trooper became
suspicious that defendant might be transporting drugs and
began to ask questions about the presence of drugs in the
car.
This Court, although noting it was "a close call,"
agreed with the trial court that the detention was
reasonable.

Id.

This Court held that

xx

Trooper Avery's

questioning of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the
traffic stop was justified because he had reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more
serious crime."

Id. (citing Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1519).

Therefore, this Court concluded that the ten-minute
detention and brief questioning of the defendant was not
unreasonable.

Id.

In this case the trial court found that *there was
reasonable suspicion to continue the inquiry or expand the
scope of the inquiry" (R. 188) based on variety of factors,
see Appellee's Br. at 29, including defendant's giving

35

Trooper Eldredge an alias at the time of the stop and
Nicki's unwonted nervousness when questioned by Trooper
Eldredge in his car (R. 187). The record supports these
findings.
Following the stop, and in accordance with prior case
law, Trooper Eldredge appropriately asked for defendant's
driver's license, discovering immediately defendant's use of
an alias (R. 115-16).

Although he did not issue a citation,

Trooper Eldredge showed Nicki, the owner of the car, the
dirt on the taillights and wiped them clean. After Trooper
Eldredge wiped off the tailights, he began questioning Nicki
about the presence of controlled substances in her car, at
which point Nicki became "very, very nervous and fidgety,"
behavior the trooper found odd considering that Nicki had
known him and his wife for several years (R. 116) . Thus, at
this point Trooper Eldredge had come upon at least two
pieces of additional information which confirmed and
intensified the trooper's suspicions and justified further
detention and inquiry of both defendant and Nicki, to wit:
defendant's alias (R. 145, 187) and Nicki's peculiar
nervousness (R. 187).
While Trooper Eldredge might have immediately and
justifiably questioned defendant about controlled
substances, he did not impermissably detain defendant while
he first questioned Nicki.

See State v. Ottesen. 920 P.2d

183, 185-86 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that the
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defendant/automobile passenger's detention for fifteen
minutes while police officer pursued investigation with
properly detained codefendant driver was not unreasonable);
State v. Hicrains. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (stating
that an automobile passenger's seizure "arguably continued
during the trip back to the [scene of the theft] but was not
unreasonable because the officers were entirely justified in
stopping the car") .
Indeed, questioning Nicki first was probably the most
expeditious, quickest and least intrusive means of
investigation.

Based on reliable information about Nicki's

drug involvement, she was at least as appropriate a target
of the trooper's suspicions as defendant.

Cf. State v.

Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1991) (holding that the
paucity of facts to support suspicion of automobile theft
did not justify expanding the scope of inquiry to include a
warrants check on the defendant/automobile passenger).
Nicki was not only the-owner of the car but also a person
Trooper Eldredge had known for years, and therefore, the
more accessible source of information about whether there
were drugs in her car.

Trooper Eldredge questioned her

while he waited for the results of a license and warrants
check on defendant, a period of at most six minutes (R. 11718).

See Marshall. 791 P.2d at 884 (concerning the

acceptable length of detention, "common sense and ordinary
human experience must govern over rigid criteria") (quoting
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United States v, Sharps, 470 u.s. 675, 685, 105 s. ct. 1568,
1575 (1985)).
Having earlier discovered defendant's use of an alias,
and then having his suspicions intensified by Nicki's
peculiar behavior and denial of drug involvement (R. 116),
Trooper Eldredge was justified in turning his attention to
defendant.

Immediately after asking defendant about drugs,

Nicki requested a coat to keep warm, whereupon the xylocaine
was discovered in defendant's jacket (R. 118).
The trial court found that the initial stop was
justifiably based on an observed traffic violation and
reasonable suspicion of drug related activity (R. 175, 188).
Defendant concedes that if he was justifiably detained at
the outset for drug related activity, then Trooper Eldredge
did not impermissably expand the scope of that detention
when he questioned defendant about drugs and discovered the
xylocaine.

Appellant's Br. at 25. Logically, this

concession also applies to a detention whose scope is
justifiably expanded, as in this case, upon the subsequent
discovery of articulable facts that intensify the officer's
suspicion of other serious crime, such as drug trafficking.
Coordinate with defendant's concession, the trial court also
found that the search of defendant's jacket was justified by
Trooper Eldredge's feeling a "bulky" item in the jacket
pocket (R. 148), a conclusion unchallenged on appeal.
In concluding that the stop was either justified at the
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outset or by the subsequent discovery of other articulable
facts, the trial court carefully assessed the accumulated
evidence and sensitively weighed the policy considerations
surrounding automobile stops as they applied to the case.
It correctly determined that although "it's a very close
call, . . . it is enough" (R. 188).
REQ7SST FOR OEAE AKQUMENT
Because of the fact-sensitive nature of search and
seizure issues and the complexity of law relevant to the
scope of detention, the State believes that oral argument
will significantly aid in the judicial decision-making
process.

Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3) (1995).
CONCESSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

. day of September,

1996.
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment — Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-la-1305. License plate and registration card
violations - Class C misdemeanor.
It is a class C misdemeanor:
(1) to break, injure, interfere with, or remove
from any vehicle any seal, lock, or device on it
for holding or displaying any license plate or
registration card attached for denoting
registration and identity of the vehicle;
(2) to remove from any registered vehicle the
license plate or registration card issued or
attached to it for its registration;
(3) to place or display any license plate or
registration card upon any other vehicle than the
one for which it was issued by the division;
(4) to use or permit the use or display of any
license plate, registration card, or permit upon
or in the operation of any vehicle other than that
for which it was issued;
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any
vehicle required by law to be registered without
having the license plate or plates securely
attached, and the registration card issued by the
division carried in the vehicle, except that the
registration card issued by the division to all
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the
towing vehicle;
(6) for any weighmaster to knowingly make any
false entry in his record of weights of vehicles
subject to registration or to knowingly report to
the commission or division any false information
regarding the weights;
(7) for any inspector, officer, agent, employee,
or other person performing any of the functions
required for the registration or operation of
vehicles subject to registration, to do, permit,

cause, connive at, or permit to be done any act
with the intent, or knowledge that the probable
effect of the act would be to injure any person,
deprive him of his property, or to injure or
defraud the state with respect to its revenues
relating to title or registration of vehicles;
(8) for any person to combine or conspire with
another to do, attempt to do, or cause or allow
any of the acts in this chapter classified as a
misdemeanor;
(9) to operate any motor vehicle with a camper
mounted on it upon any highway without displaying
a current decal in clear sight upon the rear of
the camper, issued by the county assessor of the
county in which the camper has situs for taxation;
(10) to manufacture, use, display, or sell any
facsimile or reproduction of any license plate
issued by the division or any article that would
appear to be a substitute for a license plate; or
(11) to fail to return to the division any
registration card, license plate or plates, decal,
permit, or title that has been canceled,
suspended, voided, or revoked.
§ 41-6-117. Operation of unsafe or improperly
equipped vehicles on public highways - Exceptions.
(1) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive
or move or for the owner to cause or knowingly
permit to be driven or moved on any highway any
vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in
such unsafe condition as to endanger any person,
or which does not contain those parts or is not at
all times equipped with lamps and other equipment
in proper condition and adjustment as required in
this chapter or in rules issued by the department,
or which is equipped in any manner in violation of
this chapter or those rules or for any person to
do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act
required under this chapter or those rules,
(2) Nothing in this chapter or the rules of the
department prohibit equipment required by the
United States Department of Transportation nor the
use of additional parts and accessories on any
vehicle not inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter or those rules.
(3) The provisions of this chapter and rules of
the department, with respect to equipment required
on vehicles, do not apply to implements of
husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, or farm

tractors, except as specifically made applicable.
(4) The provisions of this chapter and rules of
the department with respect to equipment required
on vehicles do not apply to motorcycles or
motor-driven cycles, except as specifically made
applicable.
(5) The provisions of this chapter and rules of
the department do not apply to vehicles moved
solely by human power, except as specifically made
applicable.
(6) The provisions of this chapter and rules of
the department with respect to equipment required
on vehicles do not apply to:
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section
41-22-3 either:
(i) on a highway designated as open for
off-highway vehicle use; or
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section
41-22-10.3; or
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry when
operated in the manner prescribed by Subsections
41-22-5.5(3) through (5).
(7) The vehicles referred to in Subsection (6)
are subject to the equipment requirements of Title
41, Chapter 22, and rules promulgated thereunder.
(8) A federal motor vehicle safety standard which
conflicts with a provision of this chapter
supersedes that provision as to any vehicle in
compliance with the federal standard. The
department shall report any such conflict to the
appropriate committees or officials of the
Legislature and may adopt a rule to replace the
superseded provision.
§ 41-6-120. Tail lamps - Illumination of rear
registration plate - Reflectors.
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and
pole trailer, and any other vehicle which is being
drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles,
shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps
mounted on the rear, which shall comply with
regulations issued by the department; provided,
the department may by regulation allow one tail
lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it
was made.
(b) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall
be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with
a white light the rear registration plate. Such
lamp shall comply with requirements of the

department.
(c) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and
pole trailer shall carry on the rear, either as a
part of the tail lamps or separately, two or more
red reflectors meeting the requirements of the
department.
§ 41-6-121.10. Stop lamps required - Supplemental
stop lamps - Turn signals.
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer,
and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or
more stop lamps meeting the requirements of the
department, provided the department may by rule
allow one stop lamp on any vehicle equipped with
only one when it was made.
(b) Supplemental stop lamps shall emit a red
light and shall be mounted not lower than 15
inches above the roadway. A supplemental stop lamp
may be mounted on the rear of a vehicle, if it is
mounted on the vertical center line of the vehicle
and is constructed and mounted so that no light
emitted from the device, either direct or
reflected, is visible to the driver. Size, design,
and candle power shall conform to federal
standards regulating stop lights.
(c) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer,
and pole trailer shall be equipped with electric
flashing turn signal lamps meeting the
requirements of the department, except that
passenger cars and trucks less than 80 inches in
width and manufactured or assembled prior to
January 1, 1953, need not be equipped with
electric turn signal lamps.
§ 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect - Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.

Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial
notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with
the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard
as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and
the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of
prior notification, the request may be made after
judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the
jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
Utah Administrative Code
R714-200-3. Prohibited Lamps, Lighting Accessories,
Decorative Lamps.
(1) It is the purpose of this section to address
the reference to "lamp" as set forth in Section
41-6-141.5.
(2) Head lamp covers, tints, emblems, decals or
other foreign materials not in place at the time
of original manufacture or not specifically
intended for use by the vehicle's original
manufacturer, and which do not meet the standards
of Title 49 CFR 571 Standard 108, U.S.D.O.T.,
shall not be placed on, in or over a head lamp.
(3) Continuous operation daytime running lamps,
(low beam head lamps) and associated system

components, are permitted on vehicles.
(4) Tail lamps, turn signal lamps, back-up lamps
and other factory installed lamps on a vehicle's
exterior, as described in Title 49 CFR 571
Standard 108 (S5) , shall not have any decals,
tints, emblems, inserts or other foreign material
on the lamp or lens that was not in place at the
time of original manufacture or not specifically
intended for use by the vehicle's original
manufacturer.
(5) Flashing lights are prohibited on any vehicle
except as authorized by Subsection 41-6-140 (c).
License plate lamps, clearance lamps, antenna
lamps, deck lamps and interior lamps visible from
a vehicle f s exterior are included in this section.
(6) No accessory lamp, decorative lamp, auxiliary
lamp, ornamental lamp or lamp system, may be
offered for sale, kept for sale, sold installed or
used on a vehicle, that does not meet the
requirements of Title 49 CFR Standard 108,
including color, positioning, aiming and location.
No colored lamps or lenses not specifically
covered by Title 49 CFR Standard 108, may be
installed on or in a vehicle, where the colored
lamp or lens would be visible to the exterior of
the vehicle. This includes any blue, purple,
green, violet, lavender, or pink lamps or lenses.
(7) This rule does not apply to implements of
husbandry, road making machinery, farm tractors,
except as specifically made applicable, and off
highway use vehicles as described in Section
41-6-117.
(8) Aftermarket .illuminating products not
approved under this rule may be submitted to the
American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, an agent for the department, for
testing and approval prior to the marketing,
installation or use of such products.
(9) If a person is denied approval of any
after-market illuminating device by the
department, appeal may be made in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46b, and such appeal shall be
considered an informal adjudicative proceeding.

ADDENDUM B

1 D. is ten to Exhibit No. 1 and the information that was
2 {available to the officer, as you listen to Exhibit No. 1,
3 You'll hear Trooper Eldredge himself in being involved in
4 pome of those conversations, nothing developed. Rather than
5 bet the individual on his way, he fabricated the search of
6 the coat. He then again fabricated the DUI and at that
7 point, Your Honor, I think he was well beyond the
8 Constitutional permissible scope, and I think it's necessary
9 {for the court to suppress any information from the stop and
10 [from the search.
11

THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to save you

12 Jsome time and direct your efforts to what I really want to
13 hear about. It's pretty clear to me that with the pretext
14 {rule announced by the supreme court that — that there was
15 reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity, even a minor
16 traffic offense for these individuals to be stopped in the
17 jfirst place. It was either speeding, or having an obscure
18 tail light, which I think is illegal even if it's day time,
19 prou should have all of your equipment working property even
20 curing day time, because at least you need your break lights
21 during the day time. Oh, and similarly, even though they hadj
22 been stopped once before for the license plate violation,
23 p.t'6 still a violation. They really should not have gone
24 another mile further down the road without fixing the front
25 License plate; taking it from the window where it was

xne Musselmon
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1 obviously not visible and placing it out in front where it
2 (would be visible.
So# I don't have any problem with the initial stop beingj
4 based on reasonable -suspicion.

Similarly, once the Zylocane

5 Was found, I don't think under all of the circumstances at
6 [Least reasonable suspicion to believe that there drugs in the)
7 Vehicle to hold them long enough for the drug dog to get
8 {there. So, I think the crux of this case is whether at the
9 time the stop expanded being simply a traffic stop and maybe
10 kt never was to becoming a —

to an inquiry concerning drugs,]

11 whether there was reasonable suspicion of further criminal
12 activity beyond that observed with regard to the traffic
13 ptop.
14

Mr. Halls.
MR. HALLS:

15 jabout that this way.

Your Honor, let me, I guess, talk

What the Court is focusing on is the

16 traffic stop aspect of it, and I think it's clearly —
17 essentially what the officer testified that he was going 65
18 piles an hour, that we had no front plate, and that he had
19 tail lights that were obscured.
20 the lights being turned on.

Now, we're not talking about]

I agree with Mr. Schultz. But

21 kou have to have your brake the lights visible, basically.
22 Bo, I think we have a circumstance for a traffic stop, but wej
23 pad every right to stop him.

I can understand whether the

24 court may have some concern about whether or not —
25 no at that point.

what we

And for that reason, I guess this is the
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1 Jknd we do thatf I think, to protect the Constitutional Right
2 {to say no.
3

So, what we're left with here is —

Oh, and what I

4 cannot consider, I think, is that there is evidence that Mr*
5 Humphrey was Involved with drugs in Grand Junction.

The best!

6 {that we can say, as far as a factor to be considered is, that]
7 {there is somebody in the police or in the police department
8 pr sheriff's office in Grand Junction that thinks Mr.
9 Humphrey has something to do with drugs. But since it's not
10 {articulated as to some specific fact that indicates his
11 pLnvolvement, that is a —
12 {rely on.

that is a very slender weight to

I don't know whether I can even place one of my

13 {toes on that in trying to find reasonable suspicion.
14

So, what we're left with is the father of the owner of

15 phe vehicle and the passenger has very good reason to believej
16 that she's a heavy methamphetamine user.
17 that she has transported drugs.

She —

She has told him

she has had a

18 romantic involvement with someone who is now in jail for
19 prugs.

I don't think I can consider that she is now getting

20 prugs from some other source, because as far as I could tell,]
21 {that is just —

that's just his conjecture.

That's a

22 conclusion he reaches, and parents may feel very comfortable
23 pn acting on these things, but judges cannot.
24 {she's involved with is someone that now —

The person

romantically

25 {involved with, who is the driver of the vehicle, is someone
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1 Who may have an alias. Well, that's somewhat suspicious,
2 phey were seen, or at least, she was seen going with someone
3 tin the car going south towards Phoenix two or three days
4 earlier, and she's now going north.
5 It here.

There's some weight

Phoenix is a place from which drugs are distributed

€ {throughout the United States. There's evidence of that.
7 Mr. Humphrey had been so nervous that the dropped his ID wheri
8 lie was stopped earlier that day. And that —
9 never alone justification for a —
10 [suspicion.

Nervousness isj

is never alone reasonable

But, I understand the court of appeals to say it

11 pay be a factor to be considered.

And then if allow that the]

12 [initial stop was proper as a traffic stop, there is the
13 additional factor of the nervousness of Miss Vought who knew
14 the officer that stopped her very well. And, in fact, —
15 Well, knew here very well. The details of that are in
16 evidence.

The questions is whether that is — whether all

17 those factors are reasonable suspicion. And the question
18 might be phrased, "If you knew this about someone, would it
19 be reasonable to suspect that they had drugs?"

Someone is

20 always using —

is a heavy user of drugs, has transported

21 |irugs, using —

with someone using an alias, had been going

22 towards a drug destination or a drug outlet two or three days]
23 earlier and was now returning from that area —

of course,

24 {there's lots of innocent things they could have been doing 25 they're very nervous, are those things enough.

And you know,!
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1 k've been going back and forth during this entire hearing as
2 fco whether those things are enough, because another way you
3 pan phrase it is, "Do we want police officers stopping people]
4 every time they have these factors?"

I don't think we want

5 police officers stopping people just because they're heavy
6 prug users. You don't get to stop people just because
7 they're heavy drug users.

You don't get to ask about drugs

8 Kust because people are nervous*

You don't get to stop

9 people just because they were going south a few days earlier,
10 ptou don't get to stop people just because they've admitted
11 transporting drugs in the past.

You don't get to stop people}

12 Hust because they've used aliases in the past.

But if you

13 put all five of those factors together, where those things
14 coincide, would it be permissible for police officers to
15 stop?

Is there enough to support reasonable suspicion?

16 k'm not at all totally convinced —

And

Well, I believe that I'n)

17 tight about this, but I realize it's a very close call. I
18 think it is enough.
19

Therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to continue

20 fche inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry or for it
21 po initially have been an inquiry concerning drugs.

So, I

22 peny the Motion to Suppress.
23

Now, we've had —

I think we've already had an

24 arraignment and the defendant's entered pleas of not guilty,
25 bf you want to set the trial date at this time, or do you
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